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Recording Industry Missteps: Suing Anonymous
Filesharers as a Last Resort
Nicholas M. MenaschC*

Introduction
Taking shape in the mid-i 990s, the clash between copyright owners
and filesharing technology proponents released a torrent of contentious

courtroom battles, culminating in a series of lawsuits filed against
anonymous individuals.
In hindsight, this conflict may have been
inevitable. Copyright law, by design, bestows in authors and artists
certain exclusive rights as incentive for the creation of original works
that ultimately enrich the public domain.' Ostensibly threatening the
vitality of the incentive-based approach, rapidly emerging peer-to-peer
("P2P") filesharing applications encroach on those exclusive rights by
facilitating the near-anonymous exchange of unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works, thus prompting the content industry's fierce
resistance to such technology. 2 The copyright owners' initial legal

strategy centered on suing P2P entities providing the capacity and access
for online filesharing, 3 however, their action spurred the development of
restructured P2P architecture, which, until recently, offered shelter from
* J.D. Candidate 2006, Pace University School of Law; B.A.
Political Science, summa
cum laude, 1999, Drew University. The author is grateful to his parents, Mary and
Maurice, for their constant support and encouragement, and to Melissa for her patience
and love throughout this process. Additionally, the author thanks the Pace Law Review
staff, in particular Lynn Javier for her thoughtful comments on early drafts, and Jessica
Sibrizzi, Matthew Walsh, and Maryam Afif for their editing assistance before
publication.
1. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 154-56 (1975) ("[T]he
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good.").
2. See generally ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 496-97, 505 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing the evolution of digital
technology, its convergence with traditional content through, inter alia, filesharing
software, and the content industry's resistance to the digital platform).
3. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001) (representing one of the first major cases in which the recording industry
challenged the distributors of filesharing technology); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios,
Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct.
2764 (2005); In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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legal liability.4 Without the ability to hold P2P entities liable, copyright
owners predictably refocused their efforts on the more risky pursuit of
those directly
reproducing and distributing the works at issue - the "end
5
users."
As illustrated by Sony Music EntertainmentInc. v. Does 1-40,6 one
of the latest suits brought against direct copyright infringers, individuals
anonymously downloading and distributing unauthorized copies of
copyrighted works on the Internet will likely lose the majority of future
courtroom battles. Courts have dismissed their claims to anonymity7 and
left targeted individuals with little recourse other than settlement. 8
However, while copyright owners maintain a significant legal advantage
in the courtroom, suing anonymous filesharers is a flawed long-term
strategy.
By prosecuting individual infringers in an attempt to
discourage illegal filesharing, copyright owners are disregarding the
utility of P2P applications, gradually marginalizing the very customers
upon whom they rely for profit generation, and possibly creating the
ingredients for a backlash against the industry. 9 There is no easy solution
to this problem. Copyright owners unquestionably must safeguard their
intellectual property rights, but stymieing the filesharing movement
through costly litigation lacks the visionary sensibility required for a
permanent solution in a robust technological age.
4. See Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154.
5. See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
1229, 1232 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that "[t]he RIAA now has begun to direct its
anti-infringement efforts against individual users of [P2P] file sharing programs"); see
also Electronic Frontier Foundation, RIAA v. The People, http://www.eff.org/
IP/P2P/?f=riaa-v-thepeople.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) (collecting cases brought
against "Doe" defendants alleged to have illegally downloaded copyrighted works).
6. 326 F. Supp. 2d 556 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
7. See, e.g., id.; Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v. Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289, 2004
WL 2095581 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004); Motown Record Co. v. Does 1-252, No. 1:04CV-439-WBH (N.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/
RIAA vThePeople/JohnDoe/20040818_MotownOpinionjreQuash.pdf.
8. John Schwartz, Music Industry Returns to Court,Altering Tactics on Filesharing,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at Cl.

9. See generally G. Richard Shell, Suing Your Customers: A Winning Business
Strategy?, Knowledge@Wharton, Oct. 22, 2003, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu
/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=863. Some fans are so opposed to this legal strategy that
they have created websites both organizing online grassroots movements to boycott
further CD sales and offering public forums to discuss action that can be taken against the
recording industry. See, e.g., Boycott-RIAA.com, Take a Stand Against the Recording
Industry of America, http://www.boycott-RIAA.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) (listing
boycotted companies, following current legal cases, and providing message board for
discussion).
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This Note surveys the courts' treatment of online copyright
infringement via P2P applications and suggests litigation alternatives that
encourage copyright protection without impeding on the public's interest
in seizing the promise of the Internet. Part I provides a general
discussion on copyright law and filesharing technology. Part II reviews
case law representing the confrontation between copyright owners and
filesharing entities. Part III discusses Sony Music EntertainmentInc. and
its impact on the legal options for copyright owners and infringing
filesharers. Part IV evaluates a selection of litigation alternatives and
proposes a model with the potential to maintain the incentive-based
approach without stifling the public's demand to explore new forms of
technology.
I. Copyright Law and the Growth of Digital Technology
A. CopyrightLaw Background
Recognizing the profound importance of a strong copyright regime,
the United States Constitution grants Congress the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. ' ° Copyright owners' exclusive rights include the right
to both "reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords""
and "distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending."' 2 Behind this grant of authority lies the rationale that "the
rights conferred by copyright... assure contributors to the store of
knowledge a fair return for their labors."' 3 Thus, copyright law
represents a quid pro quo, offering legal protection in exchange14 for a
contribution of original creative material into the public commons.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2002).

12. § 106(3).
13. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985)
(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1976)); see also
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 227 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("these twin
purposes of encouraging new works and adding to the public domain apply to
copyrights ... ").
14. Although beyond the scope of this Note, there are other philosophical
justifications for copyright protection aside from the United States' incentive-based
approach. For a thorough collection of sources reviewing these justifications, ranging
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B. P2PArchitecture and its Disruption of Content ControlMechanisms
Within the past decade, the swift progression of digital technology
has confronted increasingly the traditional boundaries of copyright law
causing federal legislation and case law to rapidly adapt to meet these
new digital realities.' 5 Professor Peter Menell explains that "by...

empowering anyone with a computer and an Internet connection to
flawlessly, inexpensively, and instantaneously reproduce and distribute
works of authorship, [the digital revolution] represents possibly the
greatest set of challenges to the copyright law." 16 Consequently, much of

the content industry continues
to believe that copyrighted works remain
7
inadequately protected. 1
The filesharing-copyright dilemma is particularly acute for sound

recording owners and artists due to the medium for their content, the
audio compact disc ("CD").

Through a computer process called

"ripping," sound recordings can be substantially compressed into a
digital audio format called MPEG-3 ("MP3") and transferred from CDs
onto computer hard drives with ease.1 8 The ripping technology is
available without cost through software applications, such as Apple's
iTunes and Microsoft's Windows Media Player, which even provide
user-friendly tutorials.' 9 Once sound recordings are compressed into
from personhood to natural rights theories, see MERGES, supra note 2, at 324-26.
15. Peter S. Menell, Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive the
Internet Age?: Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63,
65 (2002) ("More pages of copyright law have been added to the U.S. Code in the past
decade than in the prior 200 years of the republic, dating back to the first U.S. Copyright
Act adopted in 1790.").
16. Id. at64.
17. Id. at 162.
18. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster 1), 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir.
2001); see also Rio Audio, Rio Audio Glossary, http://www.digitalnetworksna.com
/shop/glossary.html#mp3 (last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (defining MP3s as "[a] standard
technology and format for compressing a sound sequence into a very small file (about
one-twelfth the size of the original file) while preserving the original level of sound
quality when it is played"); Marshall Brain, How Mp3 Files Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
http://computer.howstuffworks.com/mp31.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) (providing
technical explanation of MP3 format).
Alternative compression formats include
"WMA," a Windows Media Audio format, and "AAC," a format developed by the same
institute that developed MP3 technology. Melanie Seibert, Beyond MP3? Comparing
Digital Audio Formats, CRUTCHFIELD ADVISOR, Sept. 2, 2003, http://www.crutch
fieldadvisor.com/reviews/ISEOrgbtcspd/20030902/audiocodecs.html.
19. Apple's website offers free downloads of iTunes and emphasizes the ease of use
stating, "You can set up iTunes to automatically add tunes from a CD to your library
when you insert a disc into your computer. iTunes will even eject the disc when it's
done." Apple, iTunes-Import Music, http://www.apple.com/itunes/import.html (last
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MP3 format, high speed internet connections enable rapid transmission
of reproduced copyrighted works, via P2P filesharing applications, to the
detriment of copyright owners.2 °
Filesharing poses a substantial threat to copyright owners because it
circumvents conventional internet architecture, thereby complicating
copyright enforcement strategies. Ordinarily, the Internet operates
hierarchically, meaning an Internet Service Provider ("ISP") supplies
digital information from servers to clients. 2'
The client requests
information and the server responds in kind, providing a predominantly
downward flow of content, such as streaming video, music, and online
games. 22 Hierarchical structures allow ISPs the capacity to maintain
substantial control since they determine the availability of downstreamed
content. 23 This system is well-suited to copyright owners' employment
of a "gatekeeper regime," which focuses legal enforcement of their rights
on a finite number of intermediaries controlling the distribution of
copyrighted works.2 4 In stark contrast, pure P2P technology strips the
Internet of a controlled hierarchical structure between server and client,
allowing individual computers to take on both roles acting as "separate
and equal entit[ies] in the sharing of information. 25 Because the
controlling intermediary is entirely eliminated, the distribution
mechanism for copyrighted works is decentralized and copyright owners
are forced to pursue, inefficiently, a vast and scattered group of
infringing individuals.26
visited Sept. 7, 2005); see also Microsoft, Windows Media - Quickly Rip Your CDs to
Your Computer, http://www.microsoft.com/windows/windowsmedia/knowledgecenter
/howto/rip-howjto.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2005) (providing a one-page tutorial on
compressing audio CDs).
20. Napsterl,239 F.3d at 1011.
21. Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 297, 310

(2003).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 679, 711-717 (2003)
("[C]opyright law achieved compliance through the imposition of liability on a limited
number of intermediaries-those capable of copying and distributing works on a mass
scale.").
25. Katyal, supra note 21, at 311; see also Wu, supra note 24, at 718 ("This design,
as the name suggests, makes a P2P network one of equals, or peers. This network

architecture should, usually, be distinguished from a 'client-server' network in which one
computer (the server) specializes in serving the needs of others (the clients).").
26. See Wu, supra note 24, at 719 ("The closer a network comes to a pure P2P
design, the more disparate the targets for copyright infringement and the greater the threat
to a gatekeeper system.").
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To illustrate this principal, assume computers X, Y, and Z each
operate on the same P2P network. X initiates a request for file A which
is promptly received by Y. The action triggers Y to search its hard drive
for any matching files. Y's failure to locate the file causes it to relay the
request to Z. Following the same process, Z successfully locates A and
begins sending it to X. While A is being sent, Z searches X's available
files, and locates a file of interest, B. Z may then download B from X at
the same time that X is downloading A from Z. Each computer in the
P2P chain begins to function both as server and client through "direct
connections. '' 27 Absent from this chain is a centralized entity or
intermediary regulating the content passing between X, Y, and Z. Thus,
pure P2P network users may freely communicate ideas and exchange
files with each other virtually undisturbed by controlling government and
private entities.28
Notwithstanding P2P applications' capacity to operate as a secure
public forum for the exchange of ideas, representatives of the recording
industry argue that these networks' beneficial characteristics are
outweighed by the potential degradation in the value of copyrights
through the unauthorized exchange of copyrighted works. For example:
Time Warner CEO Richard Parsons has said, in regard to the proliferation
of peer-to-peer music sharing networks, "This is a very profound moment
historically. This isn't about a bunch of kids stealing music. It's about an
assault on everything that constitutes the cultural expression of our society.
If we fail to protect and preserve our intellectual property system, the
culture will atrophy. And corporations won't be the only ones hurt. Artists
will have no incentive to create. Worst-case
scenario: The country will end
29
up in a sort of cultural Dark Ages."
While Richard Parson's abysmal prediction may be exaggerated, trade
associations documenting recent losses in relation to filesharing offer
some validation of his outlook. 30 At least in theory, if the recording
27. Katyal,supra note 21, at 311-12.
28. See id.
29. SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE ANARCHIST IN THE LIBRARY: HOW THE CLASH
BETWEEN FREEDOM AND CONTROL IS HACKING THE REAL WORLD AND CRASHING THE

SYSTEM 22 (2004) (citing JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON THE INTERNET 151 (2001)).
30. According to the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry
("IFPI"), a worldwide trade group representing the record industry, illegal filesharing was

a key factor in a 25% five-year decline in music sales between 1999 and 2004. IFPI,
Facts on File-sharing, http://www.ifpi.org/site-content/press/20041007c.html (last visited

Sept. 7, 2005). In 2003 alone, illegal filesharing resulted in a $2.4 billion loss in U.S.
sales, accounting for 75% of the total losses. Id. Comparing sales figures from 2001

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/10
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industry continues to suffer substantial losses, the economic incentive for
the creation of new works will diminish. The question remains,
however, whether the recording industry's adversarial response to this
copyright "crisis" has been either effective or appropriate in addressing
this concern.
II. P2P in the Courts: Shaping a Legal Strategy
The Recording Industry Association of America ("RIAA"), a trade
association representing roughly ninety percent of all sound recordings
within the United States, has been described as fighting "a well-nigh
constant battle against Internet piracy, monitoring the Internet daily, and
routinely shutting down pirate [w]ebsites by sending cease-and-desist
letters and bringing lawsuits." 3' Nevertheless, despite its strenuous
efforts to halt copyright infringement on P2P networks, conflicting
reports of current filesharing usage suggest both that RIAA litigation
tactics have produced mixed results and that litigation alternatives would
be more effective. 3 2 Before discussing such alternatives, it may be
helpftl to review how the most notable cases in filesharing have
influenced the legal options of the filesharing players and triggered the
outgrowth of lawsuits against anonymous individuals. The first highprofile suit filed against a P2P program began with A&M Records, Inc. v.

with the first half of 2004, the top 50 albums shipped 16.7% less and the top one hundred
albums shipped 19.7% less. Press Release, RIAA, Record Industry Announces Mid-Year
2004 Shipment Numbers (Oct. 20, 2004) (report reflecting that a rebound in sales may be
taking place, but that the industry is still suffering from digital piracy losses), availableat
Additionally, an August 2004
http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/102004.asp.
Forester Research survey found that 36% of Europeans buy fewer CDs because they can
download music for free; only 10% said they buy more. IFPI, Facts on File-sharing,
http://www.ifpi.org/sitecontent/press/20041007c.html (last visited July 26, 2005). Please
note, however, that this statistic fails to present a comprehensive picture of the impact of
filesharing since the total number of sales gained or lost from these consumer
predispositions is absent. For example, the sales generated from the 10% of consumers
buying more CDs could offset the entire number of sales lost from the 36% of consumers
that buy less.
31. Katyal, supra note 2 1, at 321 (internal quotations omitted).
32. Compare Pew Internet Project Study, The Impact of Recording Industry Suits
against Music Swappers (Jan. 2004), http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP File_
Swapping-Memo_.0 104.pdf (nationwide phone survey conducted in early 2004 revealing
that since RIAA began filing suits, percentage of Internet users downloading music has
fallen from about 29% to 14%), with John Borland, Survey: Movie-swapping up; Kazaa
down, CNET NEWS.COM, July 13, 2004, http://news.com.com/Survey+Movieswapping
+up+Kazaa+down/21001025_35267992.html (explaining that various studies have found
no decline in filesharing activity).
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Napster, Inc."3
A. CentralizedP2P:A &M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.
Napster, the first filesharing program to receive national attention,
enabled users to: "(1) make MP3 music available for copying by other
Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other users'
computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of other users'
MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet., 34 Napster's
free MusicShare software and its system of servers enabled this
process. 35 In 2000, at the peak of its popularity, Napster boasted
approximately sixty million registered users sharing an estimated forty
million songs.36 Simultaneously, Napster's success drew the ire of the
music industry, which quickly filed suit arguing that the program
jeopardized copyright integrity and the industry's vitality.37
Due to Napster's unique system architecture, the plaintiffs
encountered an insurmountable obstacle in proving Napster directly
liable for copyright infringement. 38 Ordinarily, direct infringement is
proven by (1) establishing ownership of alleged infringing material and
(2) demonstrating that the alleged infringer violated at least one
exclusive right under section 106 of the Copyright Act, such as copying
or distributing copyrighted material. 39 Although the plaintiffs could
establish ownership with ease, Napster's servers violated no exclusive
rights.4 ° Instead, the servers incorporated a fluid centralized index,
which monitored and recorded the names of MP3 files available on its

33. 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); MARJORIE HEINS, "THE PROGRESS OF SCIENCE
AND USEFUL ARTS": WHY COPYRIGHT TODAY THREATENS INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM

35

(Free Expression Policy Project 2d ed. 2003) ("Since the late 1990s, 'peer-to-peer'
sharing of popular music has been the copyright industry's most visible concern and the
Napster case was its first big attempt to stop it."), available at http://www.
fepproject.org/policyreports/copyright2d.pdf.
34. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. (Napster1), 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir.
2001).
35. Id.

36. HEINS, supra note 33, at 35 (This popularity also encouraged venture capitalists
to support Shawn Fanning, Napster's 19 year old creator, with a fifteen million dollar
cash infusion into the company).
37. See id.
38. Kevin Michael Lemley, Comment, Protecting Consumers from Themselves:
Alleviating the Market Inequalities Created by Online Copyright Infringement in the
EntertainmentIndustry, 13 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 613, 625 (2003).

39. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1013; see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2002).
40. Lemley, supra note 38, at 625.
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logged-in users' computer systems. 4' An individual would search for a
specific song by entering the information into Napster's MusicShare
software.4 2 The MusicShare software then communicated with a central
server, prompting a scan of its index for a match to the request. 43 If a
match was found, the server software obtained the Internet address of the
host user (i.e. the user computer offering the file for download) and
relayed the address back to the requesting user.4 By providing this
information, Napster enabled the requesting user's computer to
download an identical copy of the file (often a copyrighted work)
directly from the host user's computer.45 Thus, only the Napster users
committed direct infringement.
Without the direct infringement claim against Napster, the plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction based on theories of contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement.46 Under either theory, a third party
must directly infringe the rights of a copyright holder.47 The plaintiffs
satisfied this requirement by showing that Napster users were likely
downloading their copyrighted songs in high volume.4 8 After evaluating
the strength of the plaintiffs' claims, the district court "enjoined Napster
'from engaging in, or facilitating others in copying, downloading,
uploading, transmitting, or distributing [the] plaintiffs' copyrighted
musical compositions and sound recordings . . . .,,,49 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding that the plaintiffs would likely
succeed in establishing that Napster was liable for contributory and
vicarious infringement, but reversed on the scope of the order. 50
41. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1012. For a technical overview of the strength of
Napster's centralized index system and its influence over the development of modem P2P
technology, see Clay Shirky, Listening to Napster, PEER-TO-PEER: HARNESSING THE
BENEFITS OF A DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 21, 26-30 (Andy Oram ed., 2001).
42. Napsterl, 239 F.3d at 1012.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The communication between the requesting computer and the host
computer embodied the P2P aspect of the Napster technology.
46. Id. at 1011.
47. Jennifer Norman, Note, Staying Alive: Can the Recording Industry Survive
Peer-To-Peer?,26 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 371, 372 (2003).
48. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1013-14 (The plaintiffs demonstrated ownership by
showing that as much as 70% of the files available on Napster were the plaintiffs'
copyrighted works, and that Napster users violated the plaintiffs' exclusive rights of
reproduction and distribution when these works were downloaded.).
49. Id. at 1011 (quoting A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896,
927 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
50. Id. at 1022-29.
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On the issue of contributory infringement, a defendant must (1)
have knowledge of the infringing activity and (2) induce, cause, or
materially contribute to the conduct of the infringer. 5' In Napster I, the
Ninth Circuit followed the precedent set by Sony Corp. v. Universal
Studios, Inc. (Sony-Betamax),5 2 a seminal copyright case which struck a
balance between protecting copyright and technological innovation.53
Since the technology held the capacity for commercially significant
noninfringing uses, the Ninth Circuit refused to impute Napster with
constructive knowledge of infringing activity "merely because peer-topeer file sharing technology may be used to infringe plaintiffs'
copyrights. 5 4 However, Napster possessed actual knowledge of specific
infringing activity since (1) its central server stored a fluid index of its
users' available files, many of which were infringing and (2) the
plaintiffs notified Napster of the presence of the infringing material.55
Further, Napster materially contributed since it "provide[d] 'the site and
facilities' for direct infringement., 56 Thus, the plaintiffs could show that
Napster satisfied both elements of a contributory infringement claim.
On the issue of vicarious infringement, a defendant is liable if he or
she (1) "'has the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity"'
and (2) "'a direct financial interest in such activities."' ' 57 In deciding
whether Napster met that standard, the Ninth Circuit noted that the
application "ha[d] the ability to locate infringing material listed on its
search indices, and the right to terminate users' access to the system.

51. Id. at 1019.
52. 464 U.S. 417, 419-20 (1984).
53. In Sony-Betamax, the plaintiffs held copyrights in certain television programs
aired publicly and the defendant manufactured and marketed the Betamax recorder, a
predecessor to the video cassette recorder. Id. at 419. The plaintiffs sued the defendant
for contributory copyright infringement alleging that the defendant's devices allowed
customers to record the plaintiffs' television programs in violation of copyright law. Id.
at 420. The Court held that the defendant could not be imputed with the required
knowledge of infringing activity because the Betamax recorder was also capable of
commercially significant noninfringing uses, such as recording a personal copy of a
television program to watch at a later time ("time-shifting"). Sony-Betamax, 464 U.S.
417 (1984).
54. Napster I, 239 F.3d at 1020-21. Although the Ninth Circuit failed to detail any
noninfringing uses, transferring either public domain works unprotected by copyright law
or copyrighted works with the consent of the copyright owner are examples of
noninfringing uses.
55. Id. at 1021-22.
56. Id. at 1022-23 (quoting Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264
(9th Cir. 1996)).
57. Id. at 1022 (quoting Fonovisa,Inc., 76 F.3d at 262).
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The file name indices, therefore, are within the 'premises' that Napster
has the ability to police. 5 8 Since the service neither located such
material nor blocked infringing users despite the plaintiffs' complaints, it
improperly failed to exercise "the right and ability to police its system." 59
Additionally, Napster gained a clear financial benefit by allowing the
availability of infringing material to attract a larger customer base to its
service. 60 Consequently, the plaintiffs could show that the program also
met both elements of a vicarious liability claim.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit's decision prompted the district court
to modify its injunction and order Napster to police its servers if notified
of the specific infringing activity. 6 I The difficulty in policing the
activities of millions of members quickly proved overwhelming and
Napster voluntarily shut down its service, ending its reign as the leading
P2P program.62 Nevertheless, the program's demise became only the
first of many courtroom confrontations between copyright owners and
the filesharing community.63 If the Napster plaintiffs sought to end the
filesharing revolution through the case, their efforts can only be
characterized as an abject failure. Napster, Inc.'s inadvertent message to
the developers of nascent P2P applications was unequivocal: "[b]ecause
copyright owners have relied on secondary liability theories to shut down
file-sharing services, a decentralized file-sharing service would be more
difficult for copyright owners to shut down than a centralized 'Napsterlike' system., 64 Accordingly, Napster functioned as a hi-tech guinea pig,
triggering a metamorphosis in P2P architecture as programs adapted to
operate within the technical bounds of the law:
Napster was not the only file-sharing program out there, and several others
popped up to take its place. These programs, like LimeWire and Bearshare
(both work with the far-flung Gnutella file-sharing network), do not use a
central server. Instead they rapidly pass along search queries from machine
to machine along the network-making it legally difficult to stop since
58. Id. at 1024 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 1023.
60. Id. ("Ample evidence supports the district court's finding that Napster's future
revenue is directly dependent upon 'increases in [Napster's] userbase'....").
61. See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc. (Napster I1), 284 F.3d 1091, 1095-96 (9th
Cir. 2002).
62. HEINS, supra note 33, at 36 (Napster agreed to settle with plaintiffs for twentysix million dollars, and Senator Orrin Hatch expressed disapproval that an enterprise with
a community of over fifty million users was destroyed without a trial.).
63. See id.
64. Norman, supra note 47, at 383-84.
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there is no one computer in charge. What's more, some peer-to-peer
programs now encrypt shared files to protect users.65
P2P programs were entering a stage of growth and technological
maturity.6 6 Without hesitation, copyright owners returned to the courts
to fight P2P in its decentralized form or "pure" P2P.
B. DecentralizedP2P:Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster
Ltd.
In 2001, an alliance of twenty-eight media entities sued the
distributors of several decentralized P2P programs, including Grokster
and StreamCast Networks, Inc.67 Similar to Napster, Inc., the plaintiffs
sued based on theories of secondary liability. 68 This time, however, the
district court granted partial summary judgment for the defendants.6 9
Adhering to the analysis adopted in Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding that the defendants were not liable since they (1)
lacked the knowledge and material contribution components necessary
for a contributory infringement claim and (2) could not exercise the right

and ability to supervise direct infringers necessary for a vicarious
infringement claim. y
The Ninth Circuit identified three categories of P2P programs
utilizing different indexing architecture:
(1) a centralized indexing system, maintaining a list of available files on

65. J.D. Biersdorfer, Napster's Descendants; His Beyonce, Her Beatles: A Primer
on Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2003, at G7 (emphasis added).
66. The vacuum left by Napster allowed for healthy competition among several
varieties of decentralized filesharing networks. One high-profile filesharing program
since Napster's demise has been KaZaa, a program that has been downloaded more than
270 million times as of June, 2003. See Amy Harmon, Music Labels Coming to Grips
with Web Piracy, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, June 10, 2003, at p. 1. Recently however,
BitTorrent has overtaken KaZaa's leadership position and accounts for over 53% of total
P2P traffic.
John Borland, Survey: Movie-swapping Up; Kazaa Down, CNET
NEWS.COM,
July
13,
2004,
http://news.com.com/Survey+Movieswapping+up+
Kazaa+down/2100-1025_3-5267992.html.
For a collection of no less than fifty
filesharing programs currently available to the online community, see Fresh Noise, The
Beat Goes On, http://www.aftemapster.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
67. HEINS, supra note 33, at 35.
68. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
69. Id.
70. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154. The Ninth Circuit did not provide a detailed
discussion of whether there was direct infringement by the users of the defendants'
software, rather they simply noted that it was "undisputed." Id. at 1160, 1164.
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one or more centralized servers; (2) a completely decentralized indexing
system, in which each computer maintains a list of files available on that
computer only; and (3) a "supernode"
system, in which a select number of
71
computers act as indexing servers.
Unlike Napster, which fell into the first category, the defendants
each initially operated under the "supernode" model employing
"FastTrack" technology developed by KaZaa BV.72
The software

dynamically selected a number of user computers to function as indexing
servers or "supernodes. 7 3 Each time a computer connected to the
network, it randomly operated either as a "node," simply sending out
requests and receiving files, or as a "supernode," indexing those
computers connected to it and providing file search results to requesting
computers.74 This novel adaptation allowed the defendants' software to

operate without a permanent centralized server, thus begging the
question, how does decentralized technology impact a contributory or
vicarious liability infringement analysis?
In response, the court
unambiguously ruled in favor of the redesigned P2P applications.
On the contributory infringement claim, the court again followed
Sony-Betamax.7 6
Since the defendants' software was capable of

commercially

significant noninfringing uses,77 the plaintiffs

were

required to establish that the defendants had reasonable knowledge of
71. Id. at 1158-59.
72. Id. at 1159. StreamCast eventually adopted its own "Morpheus" version of the
Gnutella open-source code after a licensing dispute with KaZaa, thus becoming a more
"pure" decentralized technology under category two. After the dispute arose, a software
upgrade offered to KaZaa and Grokster users prevented Morpheus users from
communicating with those using the FastTrack network. Id. at 1159 n.5.
73. Id. at 1159. For a more detailed discussion on how "supemode" technology
works, see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d 1029,
1039-40 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
74. Grokster Ltd., 259 F. Supp. 2d at 1040 ("[T]he technical process of locating and
connecting to a supemode-and the FastTrack network-currently occurs essentially
independently of... Grokster.").

75. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th
Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
76. Id. at 1160-61.
77. Id. at 1161-62. As an example of a noninfringing use, the court pointed out that
the band Wilco sparked interest in its latest album by releasing its songs for download on
its own website and through the defendants' software. While the band's record label
previously informed the band that the album was not commercially viable, the band's
unconventional tactic generated such interest that it secured a new recording contract. Id.
at 1161. Further, the court explained that even if only 10% of the use is legitimate, this
would mean that "hundreds of thousands of legitimate files" were being exchanged
through the defendants' software. Id. at 1162 n. 10 (emphasis added).
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specific infringing files (i.e. actual knowledge) and failed to act on such
information.78 Unlike Napster's architecture, however, the defendants'
software operated without a centralized index of its users' files.7 9
Arguably, the absence of the index prevented the defendants from
maintaining control over the files shared.80 The court noted that even if
the defendants were to shut down their servers, the users of their
software could continue operating on the network with "little or no
interruption. '8 1 Thus, the plaintiffs were unable to prove that the
defendants possessed the knowledge of infringing
uses required for a
82
liability.
infringement
contributory
of
finding
On the vicarious liability claim, the court distinguished the
defendants' technology from Napster. 83 According to the Ninth Circuit,
"the 'right and ability to supervise' describes a relationship between the
defendant and the direct infringer., 84 While Napster possessed the right
and ability to monitor its users through its control of the centralized
index and user registration requirements, the defendants maintained no
such index and could not terminate or block individual user access to its
filesharing network.85 Aside from a nominal licensing agreement, no
86
other formal agreements existed between Grokster and its users.
Without a log-in or registration process to identify and block users, the
defendants could not prevent the continued use of their network.87
Consequently, the defendants did not possess the right and ability to
supervise its users as demanded under a vicarious copyright infringement
theory.8 8
78. Id. at 1161-62.
79. Id. at 1163.
80. Id.
81. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id. Further, even if the court had found that the defendant's possessed the
requisite knowledge component, their software also fell short of making a material
contribution. Id. Since the defendants did not maintain infringing materials or indices on
their servers, as Napster did, they did not "provide the 'site and facilities' for
infringement." Id.
83. Id. at 1165.
84. Id. at 1164.
85. Id. at 1165.
86. Id. (Grokster reserved right to block access, but reservation insignificant since it
could not prevent users from gaining access in any meaningful way).
87. Id. Even if the defendants possessed the capacity to alter their files or shut
down root nodes to prevent further access, this would not be equivalent to excluding
individual users and would reach beyond the "monitoring and supervisory relationship
that has supported vicarious liability in the past." Id.
88. Id. at 1166.
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Evading traditional contributory and vicarious copyright
infringement analysis, the decentralization of P2P networks prompted the
plaintiffs' demand for a "re-examination of the law" in the name of
public policy.8 9 However, the Ninth Circuit refused to expand the
secondary liability doctrines, choosing instead to reflect on the natural
market resolution of past clashes between technological innovation and
traditional business models:
[W]e live in a quicksilver technological environment with courts ill-suited
to fix the flow of internet innovation. The introduction of new technology
is always disruptive to old markets, and particularly to those copyright
owners whose works are sold through well-established distribution
mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that time and market forces often
provide equilibrium in balancing interests, whether the new technology be
a player piano, a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal
computer, a karaoke machine, or an MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent for
courts to exercise caution before restructuring liability theories for the
purpose of 9addressing
specific market abuses, despite their apparent present
0
magnitude.

Although the court's reminder presented an opportunity for the sides to
step back and begin anew, perhaps by accommodating the profit
potential of filesharing programs and their broad user bases, the plaintiffs
petitioned the United States Supreme Court, pointing to a conflict in
legal interpretation between the Ninth Circuit ruling and a similar case
decided the previous year by the Seventh Circuit. 91
Shortly before this Note went to print, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded the Ninth Circuit's decision.92
Applying a new
inducement theory of liability to copyright law, the Court held that "one
who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe
copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken
to foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by

89. Id.
90. Id. at 1167 (internal citation omitted).
91. Tom Zeller, Jr., EntertainmentIndustry Asks Justices to Rule on File Sharing,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2004, at C4 [hereinafter Zeller I]. The Seventh Circuit disagreed
with the Napster I court's reading of Sony-Betamax, adding that courts must consider
"how 'probable' the noninfringing uses of a product are." Grokster Ltd., 380 F.3d at
1162 n.9 (quoting In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 653 (7th Cir. 2003)).
However, the Ninth Circuit declined to "read Sony-Betamax's holding as narrowly as

does the Seventh Circuit," instead adhering its own precedent. Id.
92. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764, 2783

(2005).
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third parties., 93 While recognizing the fine balance that Sony-Betamax
struck between those favoring greater copyright protection and those
favoring greater protection of technological innovation, the Court found
that the Ninth Circuit misapplied Sony-Betamax by holding that the
defendants could not be held liable without both specific knowledge of
the infringement and a failure to act on that knowledge, "even when an
actual purpose to cause infringing use is shown by evidence independent
of design and distribution of the product., 94 According to the Court,
Sony-Betamax narrowly addressed liability based on imputing intent for
product design and distribution and "did not displace" all other theories
of secondary liability. 95 The Court explained that "where evidence goes
beyond a product's characteristics or the knowledge that it may be put to
infringing uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting
96
infringement, [Sony-Betamax]'s... rule will not preclude liability."
Consequently, since the Court found evidence that Streamcast and
Grokster went beyond simply providing access to filesharing technology
and acted with, "a purpose to cause and profit from third-party acts of
copyright infringement," it remanded the case for trial.97
Although extraordinarily damaging to the Grokster Ltd. defendants'
case, the Court's holding was neither an absolute victory for copyright
owners nor an absolute defeat for filesharing entities. Notably, the Court
addressed only the most egregious situations where programmers create
filesharing networks with the intent to induce infringement and left for
another day discussion of filesharing networks created without such a
purpose. On one hand, if programmers designed a filesharing network
purely for the purpose of exchanging public domain works, the question
of whether those programmers could be held liable for their users'
infringing activity remains unanswered. On the other hand, innovation
may still be discouraged since any new product with the capacity for
infringement raises the specter of liability exposure under the auspices of
alleged inducement, regardless of the legitimacy of the claims. Given
this ambiguity, the recording industry cannot shutdown all filesharing
entities with impunity and filesharing entities are not free from liability
simply by announcing their good intentions. By the time the Court
addressed these issues, however, decentralized filesharing had already
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 2770 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2775-78.
Id. at 2778.
Id. at 2779.
Id. at 2782-83.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/10

16

2005]

RECORDING INDUSTRY MISSTEPS

left its mark, prompting an aggressive campaign to obtain the identities
of individual direct infringers.9 8
C. ProcuringEnd User Identities via the DMCA: RIAA v. Verizon
Internet Services, Inc.
On February 4, 2003, in a move to obtain the identities of alleged
direct infringers, the RIAA served Verizon Internet Services, Inc.
("Verizon") with a subpoena pursuant to section 512(h) of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 ("DMCA"). 99 Because section
512(h) permits obtaining ISP subscriber identities without filing a
lawsuit, the RIAA used the provision to deal with unwary filesharers
absent the negative publicity that a lawsuit might bring.100 Specifically,
the RIAA was interested in the identities of two Verizon subscribers who
were allegedly offering large collections of copyrighted MP3 files on
filesharing programs.' 0' Verizon challenged section 512(h) on statutory
and constitutional grounds, but the district court rejected those arguments
and ordered disclosure of the subscribers' identities in compliance with
the subpoena. 10 2 Appealing the order, Verizon argued:
(1) § 512(h) does not authorize issuance of a subpoena to an ISP acting
solely as a conduit for communications the content of which is determined
by others; if the statute does authorize such a subpoena, then the statute is
unconstitutional because (2) the district court lacked Article III jurisdiction
to issue a subpoena with no underlying "case or controversy" pending
before the court; and (3) § 512(h) violates the First Amendment because it
lacks sufficient safeguards
to protect an internet user's ability to speak and
03
associate anonymously.1

Without reaching the second or third argument, the D.C. Circuit agreed

98. See generally Matt Richtel,
Infringement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004,
99. Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.,
1229, 1231 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
100. See Robert D. Brownstone et

File-Sharing Sites Found Not Liable for
at Cl.
Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d
al., Identified Plaintiff Seeking Disclosure of

Identity of Anonymous Defendant, in KEVIN P. CRONIN & RONALD N. WEIKERS, DATA
SEC. & PRIVACY LAW: COMBATING CYBERTHREATS § 9:107.30 (Supp. 2004) ("In an

entirely new procedural context, copyright owners appear to have gained the ability-at
least in some circumstances-to obtain from [ISPs] the identities of alleged infringers
without necessarily even having to file a lawsuit.").
101. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1231.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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04
with Verizon and reversed the lower court's order.'
Surveying prior courts' treatment of online filesharing, the court
openly recognized the RIAA's need to refocus its energies on the pursuit
of individual filesharers.' 0 5 While both the filesharers' login names and
the Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses associated with those names could
easily be obtained, this information would only allow names to be traced
back to the filesharers' ISP. 10 6 Thus, the RIAA had been subpoenaing
various ISPs for their subscribers' names and addresses to either threaten
to sue or actually sue identified infringing subscribers.10 7 However, the
court disagreed with this tactic, "invalidat[ing] the use of § 512(h)
subpoenas as applied against ISP customers engaged in 'filesharing' of
copyrighted works on peer-to-peer.., networks like Napster, KaaZaa
[sic], and Grokster."' 08
According to the court, section 512(h) provides for issuance of a
subpoena to "an ISP engaged in storing on its servers material that is
infringing or the subject of infringing activity."' 1 9 Since filesharers keep
infringing material on their computer hard drive, Verizon was not
engaged in storing infringing material on its servers." 0 Instead, it was
merely "acting as a conduit for P2P communications.""' Thus, Verizon
was not obligated under section 512 to surrender the identities of its
subscribers to the RIAA." 2 Although the RIAA argued that the DMCA
should be read to include P2P, the court explained that the drafters of the
DMCA had not anticipated such a technological development:

We are not unsympathetic either to the RIAA's concern regarding the
widespread infringement of its members' copyrights, or to the need for
104. Id.
Although the court found it unnecessary to address Verizon's
constitutional arguments, similar arguments for anonymous speech and association later
appeared and were answered in Sony Music EntertainmentInc.
105. Id. at 1232.
106. Id. at 1232; see also Peter J. Pizzi, 'Doe' Defendants: The RIAA's New Front
in the Battle Against 'P2P'Filesharers,N.Y.L.J. 5, June 8, 2004 (explaining that RIAA,
using "packet-sniffing" software, could "trace file-sharing activity to particular IP
addresses.").
107. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1232 ("The RIAA has sent letters to
and filed lawsuits against several hundred such individuals, each of whom allegedly
made available for download by other users hundreds or in some cases even thousands of
.mp3 files of copyrighted recordings.").
108. Pizzi, supra note 106.
109. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d at 1233.
110. Id. at 1235.
111. Id. at 1234.
112. Id. at 1233.
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legal tools to protect those rights. It is not the province of the courts,
however, to rewrite the DMCA in order to make it fit a new and unforeseen
internet architecture, no matter how damaging the development has been to
the music industry or threatens being to the motion picture and software
industries.' 13
copyright owners' problem would have to
Therefore, any solution to the
14
Congress."
by
be addressed
Verizon Internet Services, Inc. signaled a substantial setback to the
RIAA and copyright owners generally since section 512 of the DMCA
offered a "streamlined process ... to demand the names of copyright
violators from Internet companies."' " 15 Copyright owners now must seek
alleged infringers' identities through traditional means by filing a lawsuit
against the anonymous user. 116 Perhaps reticent because of the risks
associated with filing lawsuits against anonymous infringers, the RIAA
had attempted to avoid this posture. 1 7 Nevertheless, music industry
officials announced that while they would adjust their legal strategy
according to Verizon Internet Services, Inc., the pursuit of direct
infringers would continue.'l ' Accordingly, the music industry took its
boldest step yet and began filing "John Doe" lawsuits against alleged
direct infringers.' 19

113. Id. at 1238.
114. Id. at 1238-39.
115. Schwartz, supra note 8.
116. Id.
117. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars On The "Information Superhighway":
Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1466, 1488 (1995)
("Copyright owners have traditionally avoided targeting end users of copyrighted works.
This is in part because pursuing the ultimate consumer is costly and unpopular."); see
also Norman, supra note 47, at 394 (explaining that until Verizon Internet Services, Inc.,
RIAA obtained users' identities, sent out warning letters, and settled matters without the
publicity of a time-consuming lawsuit).
118. Schwartz, supra note 8. Despite the music industry's assurances, the holding
of Verizon Internet Services, Inc. has since been tested. Under a similar fact-pattern,
Judge Kermit Bye of the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the D.C. Circuit's opinion, denying
the recording industry use of section 512 to identify anonymous filesharers. See In re
Charter Commc's, Inc., 393 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 2005).
119. Schwartz, supra note 8. It should be noted that Verizon never contested the
use of such a tactic. During the ongoing litigation, Verizon argued that the RIAA could
bring a "John Doe lawsuit" against anonymous infringers as a legitimate alternative to
using section 512 and then seek out their identity using a Rule 45 subpoena issued under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 240 F.
Supp. 2d 24, 39-40 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am.,
Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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III. Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does 1-40
Early in 2004, the recording industry initiated four "John Doe"
lawsuits against 532 individuals throughout the country. 20 The lawsuits,
filed in New York and the District of Columbia, consolidated the
2
anonymous individual filesharers into four groups of defendants.' '
Described only by their IP address, each defendant was accused of
sharing an average of over eight hundred copyrighted sound
recordings.1 2 As fall approached, the estimated number of individual
filesharers sued by the recording industry increased to roughly three
thousand nine hundred. 23 Since such lawsuits are brought against large
numbers of consolidated defendants, constitutional issues relating to
anonymous free speech and association as well as procedural and
administrative issues arise. Sony Music Entertainment Inc. addressed
these concerns.
In Sony Music Entertainment Inc., the plaintiffs, seventeen record
companies, filed suit in the Southern District Court of New York against
forty anonymous defendants, alleging that the defendants had "illegally
downloaded and distributed" the plaintiffs' copyrighted works using the
FastTrack filesharing network. 124 The plaintiffs then sought to identify
the defendants by serving a subpoena on their ISP, Cablevision Systems
Corporation ("Cablevision"), a non-party. 25 Using a publicly available
database on the Internet, the plaintiffs had traced the defendants' IP
addresses to Cablevision. 26 In its service agreement with its users,
Cablevision explicitly prohibited transmission of illegal material and also
reserved the right to disclose subscriber information when required by
law. 127

On January 26, 2004, the court granted the plaintiffs' ex parte
application to serve Cablevision with a subpoena seeking the defendants'
"name, address, telephone number, email address, and Media Access
Control address."''

28

On February 3, after receiving a letter from the

120. Schwartz, supra note 8.

121. Id.
122. Id.

123.
124.
2004).
125.
126.
127.
128.

See Richtel, supra note 98.
Sony Music Entm't Inc. v. Does 1-40, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 558 (S.D.N.Y.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id. The plaintiffs justified the need for this ex parte expedited discovery
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Electronic Frontier Foundation ("EFF"), Public Citizen, and the ACLU
objecting to the subpoena on First Amendment grounds, Judge Chin
amended his order to allow Cablevision time to notify its subscribers that
they had a window to quash the subpoena.129 Cablevision did so,
notifying its subscribers that it would disclose their information by
February 20 if objections were not raised. 3
Although Cablevision
eventually complied with the subpoena and provided information for
thirty-six defendants, four defendants moved to quash the subpoena on
First Amendment, personal jurisdiction, and joinder grounds.' 3 1 The
plaintiffs argued that the motion to quash was moot because the
defendants' information had already been provided, but Judge Chin
disagreed explaining that courts are empowered to suppress evidence or
require that it be returned.1 32 The court then set out to discuss the merits
33
of the case.
Beginning with the defendants' First Amendment claim, Judge Chin
divided his analysis into two issues: "(1) whether a person who uses the
Internet to download or distribute copyrighted music without permission
is engaging in the exercise of speech; and (2) if so, whether such a
person's identity is protected from disclosure by the First
Amendment."1 34 At the outset, the court recognized that the Supreme
Court has established that anonymous speech is protected by the First
Amendment.1 35 Further, such protection extends to speech on the
Internet.136 However, the protection for anonymous speech is not
absolute. 37 The court emphasized that copyright infringement is not
request on the grounds that it was necessary to maintain a record of the infringers'
identities. Id. ISPs often use a system of assigning "dynamic" IP addresses to their
subscribers which change each time the subscriber logs on, but since the logs quickly

build up a substantial catalogue of information, the ISP erases the information on a
regular basis. Pizzi, supra note 106.
129. Sony Music Entm 't Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 559.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 559-60.
Id. at 559-61.
Id. at 561.
Id.
Id. at 562.
Id.

136. Id. (citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); In re Verizon Internet
Servs., Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244, 259 (D.D.C.2003), rev'd on other grounds, Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Am., Inc. v. Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., 351 F.3d 1229 (D.C. Cir.
2003); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.Com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999);
ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (D.N.M. 1998), affFd, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th
Cir. 1999)).
137. Sony Music Entm't Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d at 562-63.
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subject to First Amendment protection, explaining that "[p]arties may not
use the First Amendment
to encroach upon the intellectual property
' 138
others."
of
rights
Addressing the issue of "whether the use of P2P file copying
networks to download, distribute, or make available for distribution
copyrighted sound recordings without permission, is an exercise of
speech," the court held that such conduct is protected speech but only to
a limited degree subject to other considerations.1 39
A person
downloading files through a filesharing program is not engaging in "true
expression" since there is no attempt to communicate thoughts or
ideas. 40 Instead, according to the court, filesharers only seek to acquire
free music.' 4 1 While the court acknowledged that filesharers may be
attempting to make either a statement through their unauthorized activity
or an expression through choice of musical downloads, which deserves
some First Amendment protection, downloading 42files is denied the
broader protection of the political speech category.
Given this interpretation, the First Amendment does little to bar the
disclosure of the identities of anonymous filesharers.143 According to the
court, when determining whether the filesharers' First Amendment
interests are outweighed by the need for disclosure of their identities as
parties to the litigation, five factors must be considered: "(1) a concrete
showing of a primafacie claim of actionable harm; (2) specificity of the
discovery request; (3) the absence of alternative means to obtain the
subpoenaed information; (4) a central need for the subpoenaed
information to advance the claim; and (5) the party's expectation of
privacy."'' 44 The district court's application of these factors, however,
illustrates the relative ease by which copyright owners can now bypass
filesharers' First Amendment anonymity defense.
First, the plaintiffs made a concrete showing of a primafacie claim
for actionable harm since they established ownership of the recordings,
provided a partial list of the copyrighted recordings allegedly infringed
upon, submitted evidence listing copyrighted songs downloaded by the
defendants, including the dates and times of each download, and
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
Id. (citing Reno, 521 U.S. at 870).
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 564-65 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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provided the IP addresses assigned to the "Doe" defendants. 45 Second,
the plaintiffs' request was "sufficiently specific to establish a reasonable
likelihood that the discovery request would lead to identifying
information that would make possible service upon particular defendants
who could be sued in federal courts."'146 Third, the plaintiffs showed that
1 47
they could not obtain the defendant's identities by other means.
Fourth, without the identities of the defendants, the plaintiffs could not
continue their lawsuit, thus there was a central need for the
information. 48 Finally, the court reasoned that the defendants had a
"minimal expectation of privacy" because they had agreed to
Cablevision's service agreement and they had made their computer
information available for others to see through the use of a P2P
application. 149 Therefore, given these particulars, the urgent need for the
disclosure of the filesharers'
identities outweighed the limited First
50
Amendment protection.1
The five-factor analysis is impressive on form but weak on
substance. Assuming a plaintiff brings a lawsuit against an anonymous
defendant, makes the requisite showing of copyright ownership, and
presents a list of allegedly infringed files, the remaining factors will be
boiler plate arguments in nearly every case. Plaintiffs will be able to
provide an infringing IP address by using packet-sniffing software,
demonstrate that there is no viable alternative to the subpoena since there
is no publicly available method of obtaining the filesharer's information,
confirm the central need for the information because without the
filesharer's identity, a lawsuit cannot continue, and explain that
filesharing creates a minimal expectation of privacy since every
filesharer naturally makes designated portions of their hard drive
available to other P2P users. Thus, limited protection subject to these
considerations creates a carte blanche for the recording industry that
destroys the viability of filesharers' First Amendment anonymity
defense.
In addition to dismantling the First Amendment defense, the court
also quickly dismissed the defendants' other subpoena quashing

145. Id. at 565.
146. Id. at 566 (citing Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.Com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578
(N.D. Cal. 1999)).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 566-67.
150. Id. at 564-67.
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arguments. 51
Holding that the issue of personal jurisdiction was
premature, Judge Chin reasoned that the court "has the discretion to
allow discovery to determine the basis for personal jurisdiction," and that
"without identifying information sought by plaintiffs in the Cablevision
subpoena, it would be difficult to assess properly the existence of
personal jurisdiction over the Doe Defendants."'' 52 Although the
defendants argued that available research techniques reveal the
"likelihood" that many of the defendants are not New York residents, the
court emphasized that "likelihood" does not determine personal
jurisdiction. 153 Further, on the issue of joinder, the court held that the
remedy for improper joinder is not to quash a subpoena, but severance
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.154 Accordingly,55 the district
court denied the defendants' motion to quash the subpoena.1
With filesharing activity holding steady, 56 the broader issue
regarding the wisdom of suing individual filesharers remains debatable.
As a consequence of earlier case law and Sony Music Entertainment
Inc.'s methodical analysis, copyright owners may proceed confidently in
court against centralized P2P entities, entities promoting infringement,
and infringing filesharers. 157 In particular, the proper procedural
roadmap for suing direct infringers is now clear and copyright owners
likely believe that singling out certain filesharers deters the filesharing
community as a whole.158 The First Amendment stands as a virtually
non-existent defense to preserving filesharing anonymity, and personal
jurisdiction arguments fail as premature. However, copyright owners
must think beyond their courtroom advantage and evaluate the efficacy
and drawbacks of suing individual filesharers in the long-term.
151. Id. at 567-68.
152. Id. at 567.
153. Id. at 567-68.
154. Id. at 568 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 21).

155. Id.
156. John Borland, Survey: Movie-swapping Up; Kazaa Down, CNET NEWS.COM,
July 13, 2004, http://news.com.com/Survey+Movie-swapping+up+Kazaa+down/21001025_3-5267992.html ("By June, an average of 8 million users were online at any given
time, sharing a petabyte (10 million gigabytes) of data.").
157. Shortly after Sony Music Entm't Inc., in another lawsuit against "John Doe"
filesharers, Judge Sweet of the Southern District of New York reinforced the decision by
repeating the First Amendment holding and adopting the same five-factor analysis for
weighing the subpoena against these considerations. See Elektra Entm't Group, Inc. v.
Does 1-9, No. 04 Civ. 2289, 2004 WL 2095581 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2004).
158. See Richard Raysman & Peter Brown. Copyright and Filesharing:Identifying
Anonymous Defendants, N.Y.L.J. 3, July 13, 2004 ("Identifying anonymous infringers in
the pursuit of civil damages is the first major step towards such deterrence.").
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First, consider the argument that current P2P activity indicates that
these lawsuits do little to deter filesharing. Notwithstanding reports that
the filesharing movement has diminished since the initiation of lawsuits,
millions of people continue to exchange files. 159 Deterring conduct may
be more difficult where divergent but equally valid perspectives exist on
the same issue:
The rise of peer-to-peer technology highlighted... cultural habits in a way
that threatened the powerful companies that invest billions in production,
distribution, and marketing.... While many users insist that music is
special to the human community and thus deserves special rules and
considerations, those who invest time and money in the industry insist that
a product is a product. In their view music
deserves a high level of
160
protection against unauthorized exploitation.
In essence, many filesharers continue their resistance not due to
ignorance or an inclination towards lawlessness but because they
disagree with the premise that sharing music is wrong. Absent a
recognition of these perspectives, no solution will properly balance the
desires and needs of both the filesharing community and recording
industry. Further, lost amid litigation victories and defeats is the fact that
the filesharing community is comprised of an overabundance of
dedicated music fans, many of whom actually purchase more CDs after
sampling copyrighted tracks through P2P applications.1 6' Accordingly,
litigation alternatives are better-suited to acknowledge these core value
differences and bridge the gap through compromising initiatives, rather
than combative postures which polarize the sides and alienate fans.
Second, aside from the possibility that the filesharing lawsuit
barrage has failed to deter the activity,' 62 suing otherwise law-abiding
citizens conjures up images of a gluttonous industry and creates a
considerable flow of bad publicity. For example, the recording industry
recently found itself embroiled in a nightmarish public relations scenario
when it sued a twelve year old girl in New York City and forced a two
159. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at 59.

160. Id. at 43.
161. See id. at 43-49 ("31 percent of music consumers download music and bum
CDs often. These same digital music users buy 36 percent of all CDs. Downloaders are
the music industry's best customers.").
162. By now, it should be evident that each legal step taken by the music industry
has been followed by a technological adjustment to facilitate continued filesharing. One
critic of the RIAA's strategy has noted, "[N]o legal rule is strong enough to overcome a
radical technical innovation. Courts can delay progress but they cannot stop it." Shell,
supra note 9.

25

PACE LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 26:273

thousand dollar settlement. 163 Though RIAA public relations officials
used the opportunity to remind parents to monitor their children's
Internet activity, the settlement appeared to receive more negative
attention for the trade association's heavy-handed willingness to pursue
minors. 64 Envisioning a favorable outcome from such tactics is
exceedingly difficult. Instead, the recording industry should explore real
out-of-court solutions that serve to protect copyrights without
marginalizing music fans or stifling technological growth and ideas. By
assuming a new tack, the recording industry will relieve itself of the
onerous legal costs associated with continued litigation, 165 discover new
ways to profit, and win back old customers.
IV. Litigation Alternatives: Finding the Ideal Solution
Between the filesharing community and
number of litigation alternatives have been
implemented to a limited degree, others
opposition. This part discusses a selection
alternatives and evaluates their viability as a
industry's problem.

the recording industry, a
explored; some already
quickly met by strong
of the most prominent
solution to the recording

A. TechnologicalAttacks
Probably the most controversial alternative financed by copyright
owners has been the use of technological countermeasures to combat
illegal online filesharing.166 Ranging from relatively innocuous to
somewhat aggressive in nature, these measures include: (1) "spoofing"
which involves distributing decoys of copyrighted works en masse
throughout the filesharing networks; (2) using P2P "chat" features to
send out network-wide messages reminding users that copyright
infringement is theft carrying severe legal consequences; (3) installing a
slightly invasive Trojan horse program onto filesharers' computers which
redirects filesharers seeking copyrighted works to websites where they

163. CNN, 12-year-old Settles Music Swap Lawsuit, Feb. 18, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/intemet/09/09/music.swap.settlement/index.html.
164. Id.; see also, e.g., Shell, supra note 9 (questioning the benefit of the RIAA's
recent lawsuits, including the one against a 12 year old girl).
165. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 38, at 629 (estimating the high cost of continued
litigation over filesharing).
166. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Software Bullet is Sought to Kill Musical Piracy,
N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2003, at Al.
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can legitimately purchase songs; (4) employing "freeze," an
extraordinarily aggressive program that locks the user's computer system
for a limited duration whenever the user attempts to download
copyrighted works; (5) using "silence," a program designed to scan the
user's computer and delete illegally downloaded files; and (6)
performing "interdiction,"
a technique which attacks a P2P user's
1 67
internet connection.
While such measures may be technically effective, they also carry
68
obvious drawbacks. First, many of these measures may not be legal.
Lawrence Lessig, a Stanford Law School copyright expert, explains that
the legality of these programs, "depends on if they are doing a sufficient
amount of damage.
The law has ways to deal with copyright
infringement. Freezing people's computers is not within the scope of
copyright laws." 169 Second, if the recording industry's goal is to protect
its copyrights without alienating a large sector of its consumer base,
attacking their home computers may not be the ideal solution. Instead, it
may just exacerbate the already great divide between copyright owners
and the filesharing community. For example, in a recent effort to combat
illegal filesharing, Madonna uploaded decoy tracks from her latest
release onto filesharing networks.17 ° On the tracks, Madonna could be
heard asking, "What the f*** do you think you are doing?"' 7' Rather
than deterring filesharers, Madonna's aggressive response emboldened
them as hackers retaliated by temporarily overtaking her website and
offering her latest album for download. 172 Given their illegal nature and
potential for consumer backlash, these measures, while somewhat
effective, should be avoided.
B. Legislation
Another alternative under review has been an effort to supplement
existing copyright law with legislation targeting filesharing technology.

167. Id.; see also Sabra Chartand, A Technique to Help Combat the Online Piracy
of Music Uses Decoy Files that Deliver Noise and 'Gotcha' Scoldings, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 2004, at Cl (discussing a patented software technology that enables "decoying," a
species of "spoofing").
168. Sorkin, supra note 166.
169. Id.
170. BBC News, Madonna Swears at Music Pirates, April 22, 2003,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/technology/2962475.stm.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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In particular, the Senate Judiciary Committee's consideration of the
Inducing Infringement of Copyright Act of 2004 ("Induce Act") has
drawn considerable criticism and controversy. 173 Growing out of the
recording industry's unhappiness with the Grokster Ltd. decision and
introduced by Republican Senator Orrin G. Hatch, the Induce Act would
hold anyone liable for intentionally aiding, abetting, inducing, or
procuring copyright infringement. 174 Unfortunately, the broad language
of the proposed statute would not only chill future innovative technology
possessing noninfringing uses, such as P2P networks, but would also
implicate already accepted forms of existing technology from VCRs to
MP3 players. 175 Those manufacturers providing technology capable of
substantial non-infringing uses would be left to wonder whether the
Induce Act renders Sony-Betamax obsolete.
Consequently, diverse groups such as the EFF and the Consumer
Electronics Association have united in vigorous opposition to the Induce
Act, while trade groups such as the RIAA have actively lobbied for the
177
bill's passage. 176 Although drawing bi-partisan support in Congress,
the Induce Act is misguided. While copyright owners have a right to
protect their works, their exercise of that right should not be permitted to
adversely affect the growth of innovative and beneficial technology.
Accordingly, the current proposed legislation should be avoided in favor
of less draconian alternatives.
C. Public Relations, Product Enhancements, and Online Music Services
In terms of public relations, the RIAA is already reaching out to
educate the public on the ills of illegally downloading copyrighted
material. 178 Educational efforts have run the gamut from seeking to
"educate" universities through letters of warning identifying students
engaging in illegal filesharing 179 to crafting websites aimed at a younger
173. Tom Zeller, Senate Bill Aims at Makers of File-SharingSoftware, N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 30, 2004, at Cl [hereinafter Zeller II].
174. Id. In summer 2003, Senator Orin Hatch also proposed finding a way to
destroy the computers of those engaging in illegal filesharing. Katyal, supra note 21, at
299.
175. Zeller II, supra note 173.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. RIAA, Issues-Copyright, http://www.riaa.com/issues/education/default.asp
(last visited Sept. 14, 2005) (collecting links on various educational campaigns related to
copyright infringement).
179. Janelle Brown, MP3 Crackdown, SALON.COM, Nov. 19, 1999, http://
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audiences that relate copyright issues in a simple way. 8 ° This is a
commonsensical step forward since many people may not even know
that what they are doing is wrong. 8 However, such initiatives are not
themselves sufficient. The recording industry should also enhance their
products to create a more attractive alternative to downloading MP3s of
lesser quality.' 8 2 For example, by offering complementary items as part
of a CD purchase, the product may induce a conscious choice over
copyright infringement. 83 Either a free t-shirt with every three CD
purchases or a chance at free concert tickets are promotions that fans
appreciate. Free downloads cannot replace such items.184 Not only
would these incentives dissuade illegal filesharing in a positive way, but
the recording industry would gain back some of the goodwill lost from
suing anonymous direct infringers.
Finally, online music services represent a practical alternative to
litigation by generating substantial revenue for the recording industry.
For example, Apple launched the iTunes Music Store in early 2003,
allowing consumers to download music for ninety-nine cents per song. 185
Only two years later, Apple announced that "music fans have purchased
and downloaded more than 250 million songs from the iTunes[] Music
Store. iTunes users are now downloading one and a quarter million
songs per day, which is an annual rate of almost half a billion songs per
year."' 186 Thus, based upon the cost of each song, iTunes should generate
an estimated five hundred million dollars in annual revenue for the
recording industry. Other available pay services include the re-released
Napster and Pressplay service. 87 The early success of these services
reveals that music enthusiasts are willing to pay for affordable music

archive.salon.com/tech/log/1999/11/1 7/riaa.
180. See, e.g., What's the Download.com, Find Out What Are Legal and Illegal
Online Music Downloads, http://www.whatsthedownload.com/whats the-controversy
/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
181. Norman, supra note 47, at 404.
182. Id. at 408-409.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 29, at 58-59. For an overview of the service, see
Apple, Apple- iPod + iTunes, http://www.apple.com/itunes (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
186. Press Release, Apple, iTunes Music Store Downloads Top a Quarter Billion
Songs (Jan. 24, 2005), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2005/jan/24itms.
html.
187. J.D. Biersdorfer, supra note 65. The "new" Napster boasts access to over one
million tracks for a flat monthly fee. See Napster, Napster.com Tutorial, http://
www.napster.com/tutorial/overview3.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2005).
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online. 88 However, the current services' track selection remains more
limited than catalogues offered through the collective efforts of the
filesharing community.189 Until, these catalogues become all-inclusive,
computer users will continue to turn to filesharing entities to fill the gap.
Accordingly, these services are only a solid intermediate step. The
filesharing-copyright dilemma still needs a more comprehensive
approach that compensates artists without discarding the unique
capabilities of P2P.
D. Voluntary Collective Licensing Arrangement
Recently, the EFF released a white paper proposing a voluntary
collective licensing arrangement as a favored solution. 90 Under this
regime, filesharers would pay a monthly fee to a music industry
"collecting society" in exchange for the privilege to share copyrighted
music on any available P2P application. 91 The proceeds would then be
divided among copyright owners according to the popularity of their
music among filesharers.192 Instead of stifling P2P technology, this
proposal would encourage active filesharing and competition among
various P2P applications. 93 The more users agreeing to be bound by
such an agreement, the greater the profit for the recording industry. 9 4
Through cases such as Sony Music Entertainment Inc., the conditions
have become ripe for collective licensing. Filesharers can no longer hide
safely behind the veil of anonymity. Thus, they have ample motivation
to avoid legal liability by binding themselves to a collective licensing
188. See EFF, Making P2P Pay Artists, http://www.eff.org/share/?f=compensation.
html (last visited Sept. 7, 2005).
189. See EFF, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music
File Sharing 1 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/share/collective-lic-wp.pdf
("Apple's iTunes Music Store brags about its inventory of over 500,000 songs. Sounds
pretty good, until you realize that the fans have made millions of songs available on
KaZaA [sic]."). On a personal note, this author realized quickly the significant selection
limitations of current online music services. After searching three different legitimate
online music services, including iTunes, for the "A River Runs Through It" soundtrack,
this author was disappointed to learn that it was unavailable. However, a quick search on
Soulseek, a lesser known P2P program, revealed at least one available copy of the
soundtrack.
190. See id.
191. Id. (Those paying the licensing fee would be immunized from infringement
suits for sharing copyrighted recordings.).
192. Id.
193. Id. at2.
194. Id.
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agreement. 195 Those refusing to be bound risk the continued threat of
being sued. Further, the choice could be avoided altogether by bundling
the monthly licensing fee directly into ISP users' invoices.' 96 Based
upon the size of the current filesharing community, this arrangement
could generate more than three billion dollars in profit annually.197 The

recording industry has everything to gain by implementing collective
licensing. Artists would be properly compensated and users would gain
the benefit and convenience of legitimate filesharing technology.
Further, the recording industry would relieve itself of substantial legal
expenses, allowing it to redirect these funds into the promotion of new
artists. Consequently, the recording industry's current litigation strategy
should be disregarded in favor of the voluntary collective licensing
agreement.
Conclusion
A cursory review of filesharing case law prompts two interrelated
observations.
First, at least certain forms of decentralized P2P
architecture may remain legitimate and viable, escaping secondary
liability copyright infringement claims. Second, the recording industry's
position on suing anonymous direct infringers rests on a firm legal
foundation. Given the former observation, it is unsurprising that the
recording industry increasingly relies upon the latter. However, the
availability of litigation tools at the recording industry's disposal does
not dictate their use. Suing anonymous filesharers should be the
metaphorical nuclear option for the copyright industry-one that is
threatened but never used. Litigation against direct infringers destroys
more than it accomplishes by potentially alienating a serious music fan
base while discouraging the use of promising technology. Thus,
courtroom solutions are best held at bay in favor of litigation alternatives.
Although the recording industry has tacitly acknowledged this reality
through increased public relations efforts and online MP3 services, it
The filesharing
continues to seek remedies through the courts.
phenomenon demands a more comprehensive "outside the box" solution.
More than just another idealistic notion, adoption of a voluntary

195. See EFF, A Better Way Forward: Voluntary Collective Licensing of Music
File Sharing 2 (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/share/collective-lic wp.pdf.
196. Id.
197. Id. Note that the collective licensing fee could be increased if the estimate of
60 million people is too large.
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collective licensing regime meets this urgent need. Through a voluntary
collective licensing agreement, artists will be fairly compensated for their
work and the public's appetite for P2P technology will be satisfied.
Therefore, this Note recommends the immediate abandonment of
lawsuits against anonymous filesharers and the adoption of a voluntary
collective licensing agreement.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol26/iss1/10

32

